Economic Sanctions since the United Kingdom’s Withdrawal from the European Union

In order to compare the legal consequences of sanctions adopted by different countries or groups of countries, it is first necessary to determine precisely what the concept of economic sanction encompasses[1]. Economic sanctions are coercive instruments of public law adopted by states (e.g. the United Kingdom) or regional organisations (e.g. the EU[2]) unilaterally[3]; or by international organisations (such as the UN) multilaterally. These measures aim to disrupt the normal functioning of international trade by making exchanges with the sanctioned target impossible — or at the very least more difficult — in order to compel that target to cease a given course of conduct.

To that end, private international law classifies them as overriding mandatory provisions[4], irrespective of their legal nature under public international law (retaliatory measures, countermeasures) or under domestic law. These provisions thus derogate from the ordinary operation of conflict-of-laws rules[5], by virtue of the public interest at stake in their application: this is why they are applied a priori to the determination of the law otherwise applicable to the contract or obligation in question, even if that law is the parties' chosen law[6]. However, a single transaction may be subject to several overriding mandatory provisions that are potentially contradictory: for example, a contract governed by Swiss law, partially performed in Dubai, financed by a London bank, involving a German company and a counterparty owned by a designated Russian person. A situation of this kind may simultaneously fall within European law (via the German company), English law (by reason of the bank's presence), and even Russian or Emirati law (if the connecting factors are sufficient for the court seised).

Thus, where a court identifies connecting factors with several legal orders, conflicts may arise between the sanctions themselves. If European or English law requires the application of a sanction and Russian law prohibits compliance with that sanction, the international trade operator finds itself caught between a rock and a hard place[7]. Ultimately, this situation partly short-circuits the pacifying effect of the choice-of-law clause agreed upon by the parties with respect to the application of the conflict-of-laws method: the law chosen by the parties nonetheless continues to apply to everything that is unrelated to sanctions (interpretation, non-performance, non-contractual liability, termination of contract, etc.).

The principal consequence of the Anglo-European divorce is therefore the fragmentation of legal regimes that were previously common and have now become potentially competing[8]. Thus, in order to take stock of private international law as it relates to economic sanctions, we will examine how the EU and the United Kingdom have managed — with varying degrees of success and despite fundamental methodological divergences — to preserve the coherence of their sanctions regimes, notably through the economic sanctions adopted against Russia. To this end, it will be necessary to analyse the shared philosophy and scope of application of English and European sanctions (1.), in order to better identify the differences in their implementation (2.).

01 | A Similar Philosophy and Scope of Application between European and British Sanctions

Formally, the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union (EU) entered into force on 30 January 2020. In legal terms, it was implemented progressively: it first consisted of a transition period between that date and a period of eleven months, in order to allow both economic operators and European and British governments to anticipate the new legal reality of Brexit. In the area of sanctions, therefore, the relevant date is the end of the transition period, set at 31 December 2020 by the agreement.

From 1 January 2021, the European and British sanctions regimes became independent once again, as they had been before the United Kingdom joined the European Communities in 1973. In anticipation of its withdrawal from the EU, the United Kingdom adopted the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA). This Act enables the British government to adopt sanctions that are autonomous from those adopted by the EU, while retaining the European framework as a reference[9]. It also provides for an emergency sanctions procedure, which the Minister may trigger when one of the United Kingdom's allies[10] has already sanctioned a person. There is therefore a strong likelihood that a person sanctioned by the European Union, Canada, Australia, or even the United States will also be sanctioned by the British government. This derogatory procedure cannot exceed 56 days.

The EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement concluded at the end of Brexit does not, moreover, provide for the recreation of a common foreign policy space. It remains the case, however, that these economic sanctions share a common philosophy, by virtue of the political aims and geopolitical interests shared between the European Union and the United Kingdom[11]. Indeed, this closeness was highlighted at the signing of the enhanced security and defence partnership[12] in 2025 between the United Kingdom and the European Union. Sanctions are, moreover, cited among the sectors in which cooperation should be prioritised, and this agreement takes as its model what is already being done in the context of the measures adopted against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine[13].

Thus, the differences between European and British sanctions do not necessarily result from strictly political divergences: since decisions relating to the European common foreign and security policy must be adopted by unanimity[14], such differences may result from the time needed to achieve that unanimity within the Council of the European Union[15]. Conversely, the framework established by the aforementioned SAMLA allows the United Kingdom to adopt measures far more rapidly, and to do so independently of the EU, thereby enabling the British government to assert its interests and its own geopolitical vision, particularly with regard to its history with Commonwealth countries[16].

In practice, there are two main types of economic sanctions: on the one hand, prohibitions on the export or import of certain types of goods or services; and on the other hand, asset freezes.

First, regarding trade and financial prohibitions, we may cite Regulation (EU) No 833/2014[17] and its numerous subsequent addenda[18]. These texts establish prohibitions on the import, purchase, or transfer of certain goods to or from Russia within the European Union. It was also in this spirit that the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulation 2019[19] was adopted in the United Kingdom, to prevent the withdrawal from the European Union from undermining the trade and financial sanctions imposed on Russia. These include, in no particular order: exports of luxury goods, enterprise and design software, quantum computers, advanced semiconductors, dual-use goods, lasers and batteries, steel and construction materials; disconnection from the SWIFT system; and the prohibition on the provision of legal services. Most of these prohibitions are recognised under both European and English law.

However, while they may share a common material scope (the sector targeted by the measure, which is targeted and limited), it is their personal scope that differs slightly. The personal scope of European Union sanctions is the Union's jurisdiction (the territory of all Member States). Their personal scope covers nationals of an EU territory wherever they may be located (including outside EU territory); persons and entities present on EU territory or constituted under the law of a Member State; and aircraft and vessels falling under the jurisdiction of a Member State.

British sanctions operate in a broadly similar manner to European ones, with a few differences: the personal scope of English sanctions provides that not only British subjects or entities are affected[20]; but more generally UK persons. This concept, as defined in the aforementioned SAMLA, differs from the similar concept of US person used to ensure the extraterritorial application of US sanctions to companies or individuals in third states. More specifically, US primary sanctions apply to US persons in situations where a nexus exists (involvement of a US person, goods of US origin, transaction conducted on US territory). And secondary sanctions authorise the OFAC or the State Department to threaten with sanctions any person, including a non-US person, for activities conducted in a third state, even if the transaction has no nexus with the United States[21]. Conversely, while the concept of UK person includes both British citizens even located abroad and those of British Overseas Territories, including residents of Hong Kong, for example, its extraterritorial reach[22] remains limited to the presence of UK persons abroad. In other words, it is far less extensive than the concept of US person.

Furthermore, the EU claims[23] that its sanctions are not extraterritorial, in accordance with international law[24]. In principle, they do not bind non-European persons acting outside the territory of the Union. The personal and territorial criteria therefore appear more restricted in the case of European sanctions than in the case of British sanctions. However, this claim does not withstand scrutiny, especially in light of the sanctions adopted in the context of the war in Ukraine. The measures adopted by the EU to combat non-compliance with or circumvention of sanctions extend their scope de facto, contradicting its own claim of non-extraterritoriality.

Second, asset freezes: these are temporary and targeted restrictions on property rights designed to paralyse any action taken with respect to monetary or financial assets, whether belonging to a person or an entity (private or public company, trust, association, foundation), for as long as the measure is in force. A freeze has only a prohibitive logic, with no deprivatory effects on ownership, unlike, for example, judicial confiscation or expropriation. This means that the owner recovers full ownership of their assets as soon as the measure is lifted. However, even in the absence of confiscatory effects, asset freeze measures create a legal unavailability of frozen assets, preventing any payment, transfer or set-off, neutralising security interests and suspending enforcement measures[25]. While sanctions do not prevent frozen assets from generating interest, such interest must nonetheless also be frozen[26]. All of these prohibited transactions may be subject to derogations granted by the competent national authorities.

The target of these sanctions is not solely the owner of the frozen asset[27]: the concepts of ownership, control, or indirect disposal may thus differ from the definitions ordinarily known in national law and may also extend to non-legal control of companies. These measures are administrative in nature, in that they are not adopted by a court but by a national (or European) authority. The grounds that led to the addition of the person to the list may nevertheless be challenged by way of an administrative appeal before the Council of the European Union, or by way of a judicial appeal before the General Court of the European Union.

02 | Divergences in the Implementation of Economic Sanctions: Conflicts of Overriding Mandatory Provisions and the Criterion of Control

To illustrate the divergences in the implementation of European and British economic sanctions, two examples are particularly relevant. First, the issue of conflicts of overriding mandatory provisions and interference between sanctions (1.). Second, the issue of the divergent definition of control of an entity by a sanctioned person between the EU and the United Kingdom (2.).

1. Conflicts of overriding mandatory provisions: interference between sanctions

By virtue of their particular imperative nature, their classification as overriding mandatory provisions makes compliance with them crucial for both states and the EU. This poses little difficulty where the court must apply its own prohibitive legislation or draw the consequences of the effects of a freeze order issued within its legal order (e.g. the impossibility for a debtor to meet a payment deadline). Nor does it raise difficulties when the two overriding mandatory provisions command the same thing (e.g. if the prohibition on transferring money to country X is the target of converging European and British sanctions). It is therefore unlikely, in the current climate, that their economic sanctions regimes will diverge to the point of contradiction.

This is not equally true when the sanction-as-overriding-mandatory-provision of a third state affects the obligation. Consider the case of a contract concluded between Iranian and German companies, governed by German law, submitted to the French court as the court of the place of performance, and affected by a US sanction. In this scenario, US law prohibits the German company from contracting with the Iranian one. But the purpose of this US overriding mandatory provision is not shared in Europe, which is why it was listed in the blocking regulation[28], which is itself also an overriding mandatory provision. Can US law prevent European law from applying? The European court seised therefore finds itself having to resolve a conflict of sanctions between the US sanctions law, as an overriding mandatory provision, and the European law blocking the US law, which is likewise an overriding mandatory provision. The court will therefore give precedence to its own overriding mandatory provision over that of the third state.

This example is drawn from the case Bank Melli v. Telekom Deutschland[29]. In that case, Telekom Deutschland — generating nearly half of its turnover in the United States — had unilaterally terminated all telecommunications contracts binding it to the Iranian bank Bank Melli Iran (BMI), whose designation on the list of persons designated by US secondary sanctions resulted from the US withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement in 2018. This termination had been carried out without express justification and without seeking prior authorisation from the European Commission. BMI contested the validity of the termination by invoking Article 5, paragraph 1, of Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, which prohibits any operator within the jurisdiction of a Member State from complying with the requirements arising from the foreign legislation listed in the annex. It should be noted that US legislation relating to the Iran sanctions programme had been included in the annex by Delegated Regulation No 2018/1100[30].

The operator is therefore caught in a vice from the moment the sanction is anticipated, without waiting for it to be formally notified[31]. The Court holds that the prohibition laid down by Article 5 of the blocking regulation applies even in the absence of any summons or individualised instruction from a US administrative or judicial authority. The operator cannot therefore argue that it merely anticipated future pressure to justify its termination: the mere fact of preventively complying with the requirements of US overriding mandatory law entails a violation of European overriding mandatory law. This is what Advocate General Hogan had expressed, in his Opinion[32], through the formulation that European companies face "impossible and very unfair dilemmas caused by the application of two different and directly opposing legal regimes." The operator is thus caught in a vice not at the moment when the conflict formally crystallises, but from the instant it attempts to anticipate it.

Moreover, the reversal of the burden of proof aggravates the operator's procedural position. To ensure the effectiveness of the blocking regulation, the Court decides that the burden of proof cannot rest entirely on the party invoking the violation of Article 5[33]. If all the evidence tends to indicate that a termination was carried out in compliance with US sanctions, it falls to the terminating operator to establish that its conduct was not aimed at complying with them. This solution, which neutralises contrary national procedural rules — in this case, Article 4 of the German BGB — reveals a second effect of the collision of overriding mandatory provisions: it reconfigures the rules of civil proceedings themselves, in that national evidence law yields to the effectiveness requirements of European overriding mandatory law. For the operator, this situation is all the more formidable because the evidence attesting to the absence of influence of US sanctions on its termination decision is, by its very nature, difficult to access.

Finally, freedom of contract becomes a parameter of the proportionality test, not an enforceable right. The Court accepts that the annulment of the termination constitutes a limitation on the freedom to conduct a business guaranteed by Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights[34]. But it considers that this limitation is justified and proportionate to the objective of neutralising the extraterritorial effects of US legislation. The national court must therefore strike a balance between the objectives of the blocking regulation and the risk of disproportionate economic losses to which the operator would be exposed by maintaining the contractual relationship[35] — which is, precisely, what the US sanctions themselves represent.

Thus, the Bank Melli judgment demonstrates that the conflict between US secondary sanctions law and the European blocking regulation — both characterised as overriding mandatory provisions — is not resolved by the simple primacy of the lex fori. It generates, on the contractual plane, a structural instability: the termination is simultaneously potentially required by one overriding mandatory provision and potentially annullable by another.

Ultimately, sanctions regimes still rarely specify their effects in private law[36]. The material compatibility of economic sanctions with pre-existing contractual obligations must therefore be integrated into the law of the Member States, as the European Union has no competence in the field of private law. The effectiveness of sanctions therefore depends both on the obligation in question and on the national doctrines governing obstacles to performance: for example, force majeure, act of foreign sovereign, supervening illegality, frustration, or hardship.[37] This is particularly true in the context of the decentralised application of European restrictive measures by Member States.

These divergences do not concern trade or financial prohibitions alone, and are also found with respect to asset freezes. The failure of European and British legislators to anticipate adequately such important concepts as control is thus a source of contradictions.

2. Conflicts of definitions: divergences surrounding the concept of control of an entity

Regarding the freeze, one of the main points of divergence concerns the way in which the EU and the United Kingdom treat the concept of ownership and control of a sanctioned entity: the EU applies the 50% ownership rule. If a designated person holds more than 50% of the shares of a company, or exercises control over it, the company is presumed to be under sanctions. However, this presumption may be rebutted: if the company proves that its assets are entirely insulated from the influence of the sanctioned shareholder, the freeze may be avoided[38]. All of this has recently been clarified by the Court of Justice of the European Union: seised of a preliminary reference concerning a Lithuanian company 50% owned by a sanctioned Belarusian citizen, the Court held in EM System UAB that a half-ownership stake is sufficient to establish a presumption of control, insofar as that proportion enables the blocking of strategic decisions[39]. However, the Court recalls that this presumption remains rebuttable, in the interest of protecting the rights of the defence: this outcome, as well as that of the T Trust judgment[40], supports the idea of flexibility in the analysis of the control criterion. The respondent could, for example, argue that the political rights of the majority shareholder have been restricted within the company.

The United Kingdom also applies the 50% rule. However, in a notable departure from the EU, the wording of the text does not allow for any rebuttal of the presumption, which is therefore effectively irrebuttable. Indeed, Regulation 7(2) of the Russia Regulations 2019 establishes that: "A person who is not an individual ('C') is 'owned or controlled directly or indirectly' by another person ('P') if [...] P holds directly or indirectly more than 50% of the shares or voting rights in C."[41]

The application of the freeze measure is automatic once the entity meets this objective condition of control. However, English law has gone even further with the concept of hypothetical control and the resulting test that has been developed. This was first confirmed by the Guidelines[42] issued by the British Government, but has been curtailed by several judicial decisions that merit closer attention.

The judgment in PJSC National Bank Trust v. Mints[43] caused considerable concern among economic operators. In that case, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales was required to interpret the wording of the aforementioned Russia Regulation, which provides that an entity is controlled by a sanctioned person if that person is able to ensure that the affairs of the entity are conducted "in accordance with [their] wishes".[44] This regulation would thus cover not only legal control such as shareholding, but also factual control, including that exercised by political figures. According to the English court, the effect of the constitutional powers and the supreme position occupied by President Vladimir Putin could theoretically subject any Russian company or administration to his will, implying that virtually every Russian company (public or private) could be considered to be "hypothetically controlled" by Vladimir Putin and, consequently, automatically frozen in the United Kingdom.

Hence the judgment of the High Court of England and Wales in Litasco SA v. Der Mond Oil and Gas Africa[45], which restored order to all of this. In view of the concern that had gripped economic operators following the PJSC judgment, Foxton J firmly reframed the debate by drawing an essential distinction: in that case, the judge ruled that a political leader's theoretical capacity to confiscate, requisition, or pressure a company using state prerogatives of public power does not equate to "control" within the meaning of sanctions law. Indeed, according to a criterion that may be described as factual, for there to be control, it must be demonstrated that the sanctioned person actually exercises influence (or is manifestly ready to do so) over the day-to-day or strategic affairs of the entity at the time of the facts. The mere hypothetical power to do so in the future is not sufficient.

Thus, while the hypothetical control test has been partly neutralised for companies close to certain political leaders — absent clear evidence of direct interference in the sanctioned company — it nonetheless remains useful for combating opaque structures such as certain trusts: if an oligarch possesses the hypothetical power to revoke a nominee or to alter the beneficiaries of a trust at any time, courts will consider that control is established, even if that right has not yet been exercised.

Conclusion

In conclusion, as Ramona Bloj[46] very aptly observed: "the value of sanctions lies not only in their effectiveness. A sanction is often a means of clearly signalling disapproval, a foreign policy position, more moderate than an embargo, less dangerous than military retaliatory measures. It sits midway between inaction and violent overreaction." Thus, this persistent tension between effectiveness and efficacy,[47] may be resolved through private international law. The tools that this discipline offers to resolve the questions attached to it — namely, resolving conflicts of laws and of jurisdictions, as well as questions relating to the recognition of foreign decisions and acts — could therefore constitute part of the solution. The Litasco case clearly demonstrates that the national court, in the absence of a harmonised legislative framework, becomes de facto the vehicle for coherence between the two regimes. This is a partial response, and because it is partial, an unsatisfactory one; but in the absence of anything better, it nonetheless indicates the path to follow for economic operators.

Ultimately, the foregoing survey reveals less an incompatibility between the British and European regimes than a common shortcoming: that of legislators who have designed instruments of public law without systematically anticipating their effects in private law. The shared philosophy of the two regimes — still evidenced by the security and defence partnership of May 2025 — has not been sufficient to prevent implementation divergences that undermine precisely what sanctions are meant to reinforce: legal predictability and certainty for good-faith economic operators.

This gap is particularly salient in the area of asset freezes: the fact that the presumption of control based on the 50% rule is rebuttable under European law and irrebuttable under English law is not the product of a deliberate political divergence — it is the result of legislative drafting that did not exhaust the private law consequences of the mechanism it established. It has fallen to the courts, in the cases of EM System, T Trust, and Litasco, to fill this silence by way of judicial law-making, with the uncertainties this generates for practitioners pending each new judgment. Convergence through judicial means is not without value, but it cannot substitute for legislative policy, particularly in a field as politically charged as sanctions.

Yet the tools of private international law — conflict of laws, characterisation, overriding mandatory provisions, among others — offer precisely the technical framework for articulating economic sanctions with pre-existing contractual obligations. What remains to be done is for legislators to avail themselves of these tools upstream, by specifying in European regulations on the one hand, and in statutory instruments on the other: the effects of a freeze on ongoing contracts, the fate of security interests, the conditions for force majeure or frustration, as well as the criteria for determining which national authority is competent when a single transaction simultaneously falls under several sanctions regimes. Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 represents an attempt in this direction, but it remains isolated and insufficiently systematic.

The tension between effectiveness and efficacy of sanctions noted by the doctrine is therefore not an inherent fatality of the instrument. It is, to a significant extent, the product of a deficit in legislative technique in private law and a failure to anticipate the private law consequences of sanctions. In this regard, Brexit has made this insufficiency visible by splitting regimes that were previously unified. It is in this splitting, paradoxically, that an opportunity perhaps lies: that of a coordinated reform to which the 2025 partnership formally opens the way, and which would make private international law not merely a judicial corrective to sanctions, but one of the instruments of their design.

Bibliography

• EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (2020).
• Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.
• BLOJ R., « Les sanctions, instrument privilégié de la politique étrangère européenne », Schuman Papers, n° 598, Fondation Robert Schuman, 31 mai 2021.
• Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, esp. Art. 16.
• CJEU, 21 December 2021, Bank Melli Iran v. Telekom Deutschland GmbH, C-124/20.
• CJEU, T Trust, C-483/23.
• CJEU (1st Ch.), 12 March 2026, UAB « EM SYSTEM » v. AB SEB bankas e.a., C-84/24.
• Opinion of Advocate General G. Hogan in Case C-124/20.
• UK Government guidance (OFSI) on the concept of ownership and control.
• Litasco SA v. Der Mond Oil and Gas Africa SA [2023] EWHC 2866 (Comm).
• EU–UK Security and Defence Partnership, May 2025.
• PJSC National Bank Trust v. Mints [2023] EWCA Civ 1132.
• Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in respect of Belarus.
• Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 ("Blocking Regulation"), as amended by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1100 of 6 June 2018.
• Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (esp. Art. 11).
• Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA).
• The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, SI 2019/855 (esp. Regulation 7).
• Treaty on European Union (Arts. 24 and 31 TEU).

Sources

1. The term "sanction" is used as a matter of convenience, although it is absent from both UN and European texts. Practice has, however — and for a long time — consecrated this convenience, all the more so in writings aimed at non-specialists.
2. In accordance with TFEU, Art. 215:
   "1. Where a decision, adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union, provides for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission, shall adopt the necessary measures. It shall inform the European Parliament thereof.
   2. Where a decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union so provides, the Council may adopt restrictive measures under the procedure referred to in paragraph 1 against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities." [emphasis added]
3. On the characterisation of unilateral sanctions: see in particular Beaucillon Charlotte, «The European Union's Position and Practice with Regard to Unilateral and Extraterritorial Sanctions» in Beaucillon Charlotte (dir.), Research Handbook on Unilateral and Extraterritorial Sanctions, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021, pp. 110-129
4. Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, Art. 9 §1:
   "An overriding mandatory provision is a provision the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that it is applicable to any situation falling within its scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation." [emphasis added]
5. Rules of domestic law that enable the determination of the applicable law in an international dispute that several laws may claim to govern.
6. The law chosen by the parties to govern the contract.
7. A situation already encountered with respect to US sanctions: see in particular Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. [1989] QB 728, 733, which can be rendered even more complex by the adoption of anti-suit injunctions: see in particular Gaillard Emmanuel, « Il est interdit d'interdire : réflexion sur l'utilisation des anti-suit injunctions dans l'arbitrage commercial international », Rev. Arb., 2004, n°1, pp. 47-62
8. On conflicts of overriding mandatory provisions: see in particular Rémy Benjamin, Exception d'ordre public et mécanisme des lois de police en droit international privé, Paris, Dalloz, coll. « Nouvelle Bibliothèque de thèses », 2008, pp. 466, esp. p. 394 et seq.; Papeil Anne-Sophie, Les conflits de lois de police, doctoral thesis, University of Rouen, 2014, pp. 538
9. Proctor Charles, « Chapter 14 Contractual Consequences of Sanctions before the English Courts » in Zilioli Chiara, Bismuth Régis, Thévenoz Luc, International Sanctions: Monetary and Financial Law Perspectives, Leiden, 2024, pp. 327-349, esp. 327-328
10. Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, s. 11 (2D):
    "Condition B is that relevant provision (whenever made) applies to, or in relation to, the person under the law of—
    (a)the United States of America;
    (b)the European Union;
    (c)Australia;
    (d)Canada;
    (e)any other country specified for the purposes of this paragraph in regulations made by an appropriate Minister.
11. One may also note the common philosophy of the two texts that serve as the legal basis for the adoption of sanctions:
    TEU, Art. 21, §2, b):
    "2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations in order to: [...] b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law."
    Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, s. 1.:
    "An appropriate Minister may make sanctions regulations where that Minister considers that it is appropriate to make the regulations—
    (a)for the purposes of compliance with a UN obligation,
    (b)for the purposes of compliance with any other international obligation, or
    (c)for a purpose within subsection (2).
12. Security and Defense Partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom, 19 May 2025, §14: "In support of common objectives, the EU and the UK will continue to cooperate in the area of sanctions." [emphasis added]
13. Ibid., §9
14. In accordance with TEU, Arts. 24(1) and 24(2). On the debates raised by this rule: Gálik Zoltán, « Breaking the Unanimity Rule in the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Commission's New Approach, the Logic of Legal Basis Selection and Legal Constraints », [online; last accessed 3 June 2026]; Wessel Ramses A., Anttila Elias, Obenheimer Helena, Ursu Alexandru, « The future of EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy: Assessing Legal Options for Improvement », European Law Journal, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2021, n°1, pp. 1-20
15. The adoption of the 20th package of European sanctions against Russia was blocked by Viktor Orbán's Hungarian government on the eve of high-stakes legislative elections in Hungary. See in particular: Chastand Jean-Baptiste, Malingre Virginie, « Aide à l'Ukraine, sanctions contre la Russie : les menaces de veto de Viktor Orban bousculent les projets européens », Le Monde, 24 February 2026 [online]
16. For example, the British government adopted far more severe sanctions than the EU in the 1990s against the junta that had seized power in Myanmar, a former British colony in Asia (although not a member of the Commonwealth of Nations)
17. Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine
18. As of 13 June 2026, this regulation had been amended more than 33 times by the EU Council.
19. The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/855)
20. Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, s. 21(1)
21. On the operation of US unilateral sanctions, see in particular: Goldman Zachary, Lindblom Alina, « Chapter 8. The US Position and Practice with Regards to Unilateral and Extraterritorial Sanctions: Reimagining the US Sanctions Regime in a World of Advanced Technology », in Beaucillon Charlotte (dir.), Research Handbook on Unilateral and Extraterritorial Sanctions, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021, pp. 130-147; Ruys Tom, Ryngaert Cedric, « Secondary Sanctions: A Weapon out of Control? The International Legality of, and European Responses to, US Secondary Sanctions », British Yearbook of International Law, 2020, vol. 0, p. 1-116
22. For an overview of practice in this area, see Beaucillon Charlotte, « Panorama de la pratique contemporaine des sanctions extraterritoriales » in Miron Alina, Taxil Bérangère (dirs), Extraterritorialités et droit international, Colloque SFDI d'Angers, Paris, Éditions A. Pedone, 2019
23. The question of the coherence between the European Union's position on US extraterritorial sanctions and the position it is increasingly adopting, notably vis-à-vis third parties and its sanctions against Russia, is raised in particular by: Bismuth Régis, « Les nouvelles frontières des sanctions européennes et les zones grises du droit international », Rev. Eur. de Droit, 2023, pp. 8-14, esp. p. 11-12
24. See for example: Council of the European Union, Guidelines on sanctions, 2 July 2024, doc. No 11618/24_,_ §9
25. Measures that may however be subject to derogations from the national authorities designated by the Member States in the EU Council — in France, the Directorate-General of the Treasury. On the authorisation procedure: Direction générale du Trésor, Lignes directrices conjointes de la direction générale du Trésor et de l'Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution sur la mise en œuvre des mesures de gel des avoirs, 16 March 2026, pp. 46, esp. p. 10-12
26. CJEU, 11 November 2021, Bank Sepah v. Overseas Financial Limited, Oaktree Finance Limited, C-340/20
27. When the sanction is directly aimed at its recipient, it is characterised as primary; it is characterised as a secondary sanction when, conversely, the measure is intended to reinforce primary sanctions by seeking to alter the behaviour of natural or legal persons in third countries that do not fall within the jurisdiction of the sanctioning state.
28. Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom
29. CJEU, Grand Chamber, 21 December 2021, Bank Melli Iran v. Telekom Deutschland GmbH, C-124/20
30. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 2018/1100 of 6 June 2018 amending the Annex to Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom
31. CJEU, Grand Chamber, 21 December 2021, Bank Melli Iran v. Telekom Deutschland GmbH, C-124/20, §51
32. AG Opinion, Bank Melli, §65. On this Opinion, see J.-G. de Tocqueville, N. Brice et D. Aumain, JCP 2021. 1250; A. Amir-Aslani et Q. Coppens, Rev. internat. compl. éth. aff. 2021, n° 4, p. 20. On this point: Chanzy Thomas, Guillemin Thibault, « Sur les programmes américains de sanctions et la réglementation européenne de blocage : les entreprises françaises prises entre deux feux », Rev. Crit. DIP, 2022, n°2, pp. 435-439
33. CJEU, Grand Chamber, 21 December 2021, Bank Melli Iran v. Telekom Deutschland GmbH, C-124/20, §65
34. Ibid. § 77
35. Ibid. § 92
36. Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 nonetheless provides in its Article 11:
    "1. No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation shall be satisfied, including claims for indemnification or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, financial or other guarantee or indemnity, of whatever form, made by: [...] b) any other Russian natural or legal person, entity or body;"
37. Azerado da Silveira Mercedeh, Trade Sanctions and International Sales. An Inquiry into International Arbitration and Commercial Litigation, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2014, 416 pp.
38. European Commission, « Policy Paper Fondation R. Schuman », Question d'Europe, n° 598, 31 May 2021 [online]:
    "[...] if the listed person is deemed to own or control a non-listed entity, it can be presumed that the control also extends to the assets of that entity [...]. This presumption can be rebutted on a case-by-case basis by the entity concerned, if it can be demonstrated that some or all of its assets are not held by or are outside the control of the listed person [...]." [emphasis added]
39. CJEU, 12 March 2026, UAB „EM SYSTEM" v. AB SEB bankas et AS „Citadele banka" Lietuvos filialas, C-84/24
40. CJEU, 21 May 2026, D et. al. v. Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze et. al. (T Trust), C-483-23
41. "A person who is not an individual ('C') is 'owned or controlled directly or indirectly' by another person ('P') if [...] P holds directly or indirectly more than 50% of the shares or voting rights in C." [emphasis added]
42. Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation – HM Treasury, General guidance for and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, August 2022, pp. 47
43. Mints and others v. PJSC National Bank Trust and another, UKSC [2023] 0146; see also the Court of Appeal judgment in the same case [2023] EWCA Civ 1132
44. Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, s. 7 (4):
    "to achieve the result that affairs of C are conducted in accordance with P's wishes."
45. Litasco SA v. Der Mond Oil and Gas Africa [2023] EWHC 2866 (Comm.)
46. Bloj Ramona, « Policy Paper Fondation Robert Schuman », Question d'Europe, n° 598, 31 May 2021 [online]
47. Giumelli Francesco, « From Effective to Useful Sanctions: Lessons Learned from the Experience of the European Union » in Ronzitti Nino (dir.), Coercive Diplomacy, Sanctions and International Law, Boston, Brill Nijhoff, p. 246-269.